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 Abstract 
This paper uses 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data aggregated by census tract to measure 
the relationship between census tract-level college completion rates and the rates at which first lien 
refinance mortgage applicants submit incomplete loan applications, withdraw loan applications before 
they are reviewed, and reject lender approved loan offers. This paper also explores the relationship 
between tract-level college completion rates and the mean interest rate borrowers received for a subset of 
high-cost loans. The results indicate that first lien refinance loan applicants in tracts with higher rates of 
college completion are less likely to submit incomplete applications, to withdraw applications before they 
are reviewed by the lender, and to reject lender-approved loan offers. Tracts with higher rates of college 
completion pay lower mean interest rates as reported by lenders for high-cost loans. Consumers in census 
tracts with lower rates of college completion may engage in different search strategies for mortgage credit 
options than consumers in tracts with higher college completion rates. To the extent education is 
correlated with financial capability, these findings suggest loan applicants with lower educational 
attainment lack financial literacy concerning refinance mortgage application search strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
Few financial transactions are as confusing as applying for and closing on a mortgage, yet 
mortgages are a critical tool for households’ financial development. Mortgage contracts are complex 
instruments that vary significantly in structure and cost; a mortgage is typically the largest credit 
obligation households will undertake. Access to homeownership and appreciation in home equity 
leveraged through a long-term mortgage has historically been a primary mechanism for low- and middle-
income households to accumulate financial assets (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2000); however, 
mortgages involve risks and may absorb a significant portion of a household’s budget. The selection of an 
appropriate mortgage loan can lower housing costs by tens of thousands of dollars over a 30-year loan, 
which in turn improves the borrower’s financial circumstances.  
The mortgage market has changed significantly in the last decade. In the early 2000s, the number 
of home loan options available to consumers increased considerably (Quercia, Stegman, and Davis, 
2004). The advent of subprime lending ushered in credit to higher-risk borrowers who were previously 
unable to obtain mortgage credit (Hogarth and Hilgert, 2002). During the early 2000s, consumers often 
obtained loans through non-bank institutions, including national commercial lenders relying on third-
party mortgage brokers to solicit borrowers and complete loan transactions (Quercia et al.). By the late 
2000s, the mortgage market had contracted sharply due to slumping housing markets and lax lending 
policies. The rapid expansion and subsequent contraction of the mortgage and housing markets has 
spurred a vigorous debate about how well consumers can navigate the mortgage market and whether 
some lending institutions and/or loan products are not in borrowers’ best interests (GAO, 2004). Of 
primary concern tend to be borrowers who lack knowledge of and experience with mortgage markets and 
who are therefore more vulnerable to the markets’ challenges.  2 
This paper examines the role of the college completion rate of residents in a census tract on 
consumers’ behavior during the first lien refinance mortgage loan application process. This analysis uses 
data on first lien refinance mortgage loans as reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA). Application behavior—especially applications that fail to deliver any information about a loan 
approval—may be another useful proxy or indicator of the level of a consumer’s financial literacy or 
capacity. The results of this study are instructive for state and federal policymakers, as well as for 
advocates concerned about consumer welfare in the mortgage market. Further illustrations of financial 
literacy are discussed regarding census tract-level control variables such as race, income, age, and the 
share of residents in owner-occupied homes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mortgage Search Processes and Education Levels 
Traditional economic theory suggests that consumers will search for mortgage loan options by 
reviewing available information on price and other features. Consumers are generally expected to search 
for and process information up to the point at which the marginal cost of acquiring and processing further 
information equals the marginal benefit of that information for making a decision (Stigler, 1961). Much 
of this theory, however, is based on a consumer’s ability to obtain complete information. Information in 
the mortgage market tends to be heterogeneous across loan types, involves technical terms, and requires 
calculations of the long-term time value of money. Searching for a mortgage requires consumers to incur 
the costs of learning about types of loans and loan terms, or paying a specialist for such advice. Even 
consumers who seek out advice may be misled. All too common is the story of a borrower who signs a 
mortgage contract that a mortgage broker promoted based on the broker’s own financial incentives rather 
than the borrower’s needs.  
It is unlikely that refinance mortgage applicants have acquired significant insights from their past 
experiences in the mortgage market. Most borrowers engage in mortgage transactions infrequently, 3 
resulting in a lack of familiarity with the mortgage market and few opportunities to develop proficiency at 
shopping for a mortgage (Gibler and Nelson, 2003). The mortgage market could be an example of a 
market in which consumers have access to weak forms of information during the search process. In such 
markets, producers have fewer incentives to compete over the positive attributes of their product. 
Consumer welfare can be reduced, since these markets may not allocate products efficiently to various 
classes of consumers (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981). Even in relatively competitive non-
concentrated lending markets, the extent to which consumers lack information (or the ability to process 
available information) can result in mortgage lenders exerting market power and earning supra-normal 
profits (Inderst, 2005). 
Formal education may be an important predictor of how loan applicants search for and obtain 
mortgages. Higher levels of education may facilitate better comprehension of loan options and the 
solicitation of more options. Russo, Staelin, Nolan, Russell, and Metcalf (1986) found that consumers 
engage in three activities when searching for a product or service: (1) collection, (2) computation, and (3) 
comprehension. The last activity is dependent on the consumer’s ability to process information, relative to 
other information, and use the information to make a decision. The ability to comprehend information 
varies according to the consumer’s knowledge and cognitive capacity. This comprehension stage is best 
managed by better educated and higher income consumers, who tend to be the most aggressive in 
collecting information and more adept at computation (Crosby and Taylor, 1981). Prior studies indicate 
strong associations among income, education, and performance across a variety of financial capability 
measures (Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly, 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). 
In research on consumers’ financial capability, the concept of financial literacy has become 
increasingly prevalent. “Financial literacy” is a commonly used term but arguably an imprecise one. It 
borrows from the reading literacy field in assuming that literacy can be taught, can be measured, and is a 
cumulative skill set that individuals acquire as they move from infancy, through school, and into 
adulthood. Unlike reading literacy, there is no broadly accepted set of criteria for judging or testing 4 
financial literacy. The President’s Advisory Council on Financial Literacy (2009) defines financial 
literacy as, “the ability to use knowledge and skills to manage financial resources effectively for a lifetime 
of financial well-being.” There is an important debate in the financial literacy field concerning the extent 
to which financial literacy can and should be judged on the basis of knowledge versus behavior. The 
President’s Advisory Council (2009) observes that financial literacy includes knowledge and actions in 
response to context. Similar to the case for reading literacy, which is advocated as a tool for participating 
successfully in society, financial literacy is a set of skills that inform decisions, affect behavior, and 
ultimately lead to beneficial outcomes. Given the potential costs and long-term nature of mortgage 
contracts, a consumer’s behavior in the mortgage market is arguably one of the most important contexts 
in which differences in financial literacy may become observable.  
Low socioeconomic status consumers may face a number of informational disadvantages in credit 
markets. Financial knowledge measures tend to be lower for lower-income consumers (Agnew and 
Szykman, 2005; Bernheim, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2005; Mandell, 2004). Understanding how 
interest accrues and is charged tends to be a particular area of weakness (Moore, 2003). Bucks and Pence 
(2006) show that low-income mortgage borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages are the most likely to 
underestimate how much the interest rate on their loan could change relative to their contract. The authors 
find low-income borrowers were 28 percent more likely to be unaware of their interest rate than higher 
income borrowers. Furthermore, the authors find a lack of education exacerbates this problem. Low-
income consumers with less than a college degree were among the least informed about the terms of their 
mortgage. The authors also suggest borrowers of a non-white race have similarly low knowledge levels 
regarding their mortgage terms.  
Of course, formal education is not the only indicator of financial capability and comprehension. 
Consumers may rely on external sources of information during the mortgage search process, including 
their family and friends. Some consumers may also obtain information from brochures and other sources 
(Beales et al., 1981). For mortgage applicants, an important external source of information may be 5 
neighbors who own homes. Given that neighborhoods tend to be homogenous along housing and 
household types, nearby homeowners may have experiences with refinancing a mortgage that influence 
their own mortgage shopping behavior—neighbors may serve as a “check-in” to verify loan terms or 
alternatives. Loan applicants in census tracts with greater proportions of homeowners may be more likely 
to have access to informal information and advice relative to refinance mortgage loan applicants in areas 
with lower rates of homeownership. Because homeownership rates are correlated with socioeconomic 
status, controlling for income, education, and other factors will be important in order to isolate the effects 
of homeownership as a proxy for the prevalence of informal advice. 
One category of loan applicant worthy of particular consideration is elderly persons. Senior 
citizens are cited as one population victimized by predatory mortgage loans they do not understand and 
that were pushed upon them by an aggressive lender or broker (GAO, 2004). One may expect that older 
homeowners would have an advantage in mortgage markets given their longer tenure as homeowners and 
the potential for more extensive experience in the home mortgage market. However, the nature of the 
mortgage market, with its wide array of loan types and lending institutions, provides few opportunities for 
applied learning over time. In fact, Bucks and Pence (2008) suggest that seniors “are substantially more 
likely not to know their mortgage terms,” which could be a signal of financial literacy failures (p. 227). 
The authors show that 60 percent of borrowers aged 65 or older do not know the details of their mortgage, 
compared with 30 percent of younger borrowers. Other studies affirm that older borrowers are more likely 
to have reduced cognitive abilities (Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2009; Korniotis and Kumar, 2007, 
2008). Older individuals also appear more prone to making financial mistakes in credit markets by failing 
to use and pay off credit optimally (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson, 2007). Given Bucks and 
Pence’s (2008) finding that lower income mortgage borrowers, borrowers with lower levels of education, 
and minority borrowers have lower levels of financial literacy related to mortgage markets, the additional 
factor of age is important to consider in models of financial behavior. 6 
Previous studies have analyzed direct measures of financial literacy, including factual questions 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Mandell and Klein, 2009). Others studies have examined financial behaviors 
that could be reasonably associated with lower levels of financial literacy (Hogarth and Hilgert, 2002; 
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2005; Lusardi, Tufano, and Field, 2009). Mortgage application decisions have not 
been a focus of the literature in the past, although this is a critical area and one with far reaching effects. 
Mortgages represented almost 90 cents of every dollar of an average household’s total debt obligations in 
2004 (Crook and Hochguertel, 2007). This is a domain of financial literacy that could have profound 
implications for consumers. Importantly, past research suggests that interest rate calculations and 
comparisons, core tasks in the refinance decision, are areas of financial capability that are particularly 
problematic (Campbell, 2006; Lusardi et al., 2009; Moore, 2003; Stango and Zinman, 2006). 
Lower financial literacy may not impede consumers from obtaining refinance mortgages, but it 
may make the process of shopping for a loan, assimilating information, and understanding alternatives 
more costly and time consuming. Borrowers who fail to fully process and understand their mortgage 
terms may take out higher cost mortgages than they otherwise could have qualified for (Lax, Manti, Raca, 
and Zorn, 2004). Other borrowers may not refinance even if their terms are less attractive than current 
market rates and terms (Campbell, 2006). Woodward (2003) finds that shopping for a mortgage may be 
less likely among minority and less-educated borrowers, and as a result these borrowers pay significantly 
higher rates and fees. 
Refinance loans are a particularly important segment of the market to study. First, these 
borrowers are remaining in their current home, and the mortgage is not tied to a home sale, making the 
analysis more straightforward. Second, the refinance market generally has a wide array of lenders, 
brokers, and credit unions offering products in almost all markets, including telephone- and Internet-
based providers. Third, refinance products have great variation in terms, fees, interest rates, and the ability 
to finance more than the existing loan in order to ‘cash out’ home equity (at least in periods of rising 7 
home values, as evidenced in 2005). Thus, there is variation in the terms consumers might compare across 
loan alternatives but less variation in terms of situational contexts. 
Prior Research on Mortgage Searches 
There are few studies examining consumers’ mortgage search behaviors. Lee and Hogarth (1999, 
2000) analyzed mortgage borrowers’ shopping behavior using self-reported survey data. The authors’ 
data analysis indicates wide variation in consumers’ search behaviors. The authors also found that 
borrowers with more education conducted wider searches, and that borrowers who expected to be denied 
for a loan engaged in more limited searches (Lee and Hogarth, 2000).  
Although the literature on consumers’ mortgage search processes is scarce, it appears that 
consumers searching for refinance mortgages engage in similar behaviors as consumers in the market for 
other mortgage products. Early research on refinance searches focused on consumers’ slow response to 
decreases in interest rates and their sluggishness to refinance when it would be optimal to do so. In the 
early 2000s, a significant proportion of households continued to pay interest rates that exceeded the 
available rates considerably. Campbell (2006) estimates that during the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
between 36 percent and 45 percent of households paid an interest rate that was at least 1.5 percentage 
points higher than the available rate. Further, between 6 percent and 8 percent of households paid rates 
that were more than 3 percentage points higher than the available rate. Lee and Hogarth (2000) compared 
the mortgage search behaviors of refinancers to the behaviors of other mortgage borrowers. While 23 
percent of other mortgage borrowers contacted only one lender, 14 percent of refinancers contacted just 
one lender. The authors found no difference in the mean or median number of information sources 
borrowers consulted, though the types of information sources varied between refinancers and other 
borrowers. For instance, other mortgage borrowers were four times more likely to report obtaining 
information from real estate agents, and refinancers were twice as likely to report getting information 
from advertisements. In an earlier study, Lee and Hogarth (1999) found that greater search efforts led to 8 
lower interest rates for refinancers but not for other mortgage borrowers. The authors also found that 
refinancers were more likely to engage in lengthier searches than other mortgage borrowers, likely due to 
the relative differences in time pressures. Woodward (2003) compares the fees paid for refinance 
mortgages and purchase loans, finding that although refinancings are simpler the fee is higher on average, 
in part due to differences in shopping behavior. 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data have been used for many papers analyzing 
mortgage applications and denial rates by race and income. Avery et al. (2005) provide one of the most 
comprehensive analyses of HMDA data on a national scale, including special forms of HMDA data 
available to the Federal Reserve Board such as census tract-level credit scores. The authors did not 
control for tract-level education levels or age, however. Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004) perform an 
analysis of HMDA data in a limited number of areas with a focus on neighborhood effects, finding strong 
intra-tract correlations in mortgage application denial rates and the growth in subprime lending. The 
authors utilize a number of tract-level variables from the 2000 census, including the percentage of the 
population over age 25 with a college degree. Nevertheless, the authors examined neither incomplete and 
withdrawn applications nor annual percentage rate (APR) spreads. More recently, Ding, Ratcliffe, 
Stegman, and Quercia (2008) examined HMDA data for the Atlanta metropolitan area, including APR 
spreads. They found that census tracts with lower mean incomes and higher proportions of minority loan 
applicants tend to have larger APR spreads. 
METHODOLOGY 
Hypotheses 
This paper explores four hypotheses about the relationship between first lien home mortgage 
refinance loan applicants’ behavior and education level by tract, as measured by HMDA and census data, 
respectively: 
H1. Tract rates of college completion are negatively associated with the mean rate of 
borrowers submitting incomplete first lien refinance mortgage applications in the tract, 9 
controlling for tract mean levels of borrower race/ethnicity, borrower income, age 
reported in the census, and the prevalence of homeownership in the tract. 
Incomplete applications may be one of the clearest signs of a lack of financial sophistication. 
Submitting partial applications incurs time costs of completing paperwork and gathering documents, as 
well as nonrefundable application fees. Submitting an incomplete application is potentially a waste of the 
consumer’s time and resources. Federal regulations require lenders to send a written notice of 
incompleteness (under section 202.9(c)(2) of Regulation B, Equal Credit Opportunity) and to request the 
applicant respond to a request for additional information within a specified period of time. If the 
consumer fails to respond, the application is closed and filed as incomplete. The rate of applicants in a 
tract submitting incomplete applications should provide an indication of the prevalence of borrowers 
failing to navigate the mortgage application process. The rate of incomplete mortgage application 
submissions is hypothesized to be negatively associated with the share of the tract population with a 
bachelor’s degree. 
H2. Tract rates of college completion are negatively associated with the mean rate of 
applicants withdrawing completed first lien refinance mortgage applications in the tract, 
controlling for mean levels of borrower race/ ethnicity, borrower income, age reported in 
the census, and the prevalence of homeownership in the tract. 
Whereas incomplete applications are defined by the lender, withdrawn applications result from 
borrowers’ actions. A withdrawn application suggests the consumer requested the file to be closed (in 
person, on the telephone, or in writing) before a credit application was made. The lender may or may not 
have had enough information to act on the application, but the applicant never received a decision. This 
could be due to a change in circumstances, but given the up-front costs of making the application, it 
would be reasonable to wait for the lender’s decision. Consumers may shop multiple lenders and submit 
several applications in order to explore terms and pricing, but this represents an inefficient application 
strategy given the time and financial costs of completing an application. The rate at which loan applicants 
withdraw their submitted mortgage applications is hypothesized to be negatively associated with the share 
of the tract population with a bachelor’s degree. 10 
H3. Tract rates of college completion are positively associated with the mean rate of 
applicants rejecting lender approved first lien refinance loans in the tract, controlling for 
mean levels of borrower race/ethnicity, borrower income, age as reported in the census, 
and the prevalence of homeownership in the tract. 
Rejecting an approved loan offer is a borrower-driven decision in which a complete application is 
submitted and fully approved by the lender. The borrower then rejects the lender’s approval and does not 
close the loan. This outcome is more challenging to interpret than the two previous outcomes. Some 
consumers who reject an approved offer will have submitted multiple applications and will then have 
selected the best approved offer. Because this paper analyzes first lien refinance mortgage loans, 
applicants are not required to obtain a loan. Applicants may decide not to take out any loan at all. As with 
withdrawn applications, there are costs for loan applicants to reach this stage in the process; searching 
among terms and rates might be more efficient before making an application. Alternatively, rejecting an 
approved loan offer may suggest some consideration of the loan terms and conditions, and would 
therefore entail a level of information processing that may be facilitated by formal education. Therefore, 
the rate at which mortgage applicants reject approved loan offers is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with the share of the tract population with a bachelor’s degree.  
H4. Tract education levels are negatively associated with the mean interest rate reported 
by lenders for originated high-cost loans in the tract, controlling for race/ethnicity, 
income, age, and the prevalence of homeownership in the tract. 
In the HMDA data, interest rates are provided for a subset of loan applications. Lenders only 
report an interest rate for loans that were approved and originated and only if the rate was at least 300 
basis points greater than the10-year Treasury rate. Lenders do not report the actual interest rate, but rather 
the difference between the APR and the Treasury bond benchmark rate. As tract mean education levels 
increase, borrowers may become savvier in searching among high-cost loans and engage in more 
searching and shopping. Thus, the mean APR spread is hypothesized to be negatively associated with the 
share of the tract population with a bachelor’s degree. 11 
Data 
Each year, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (www.ffiec.gov) releases the 
HMDA database, which documents loan applications recorded by regulated mortgage lenders. Previous 
studies have used HMDA data to examine mortgage origination and denial patterns, trends in lending by 
type of financial institution, and general trends in loan volumes and borrower characteristics. Included in 
these data are several measures that are rarely cited in the literature: borrowers who submit incomplete 
applications as determined by lending institutions, borrowers who withdraw their applications before 
receiving an evaluation, and borrowers who reject approved loan offers. These three measures can be 
viewed as indicators of consumer behavior. In 2004, HMDA began reporting the spread between the APR 
on the loan and the 10-year Treasury rate, though only for loans that were approved and originated and 
only if the APR spread was at least 300 basis points.  
Sample 
Data from 2005 loan applications from 50 states was aggregated at the census tract level for first 
lien refinance loan applications for 66,000 tracts. This aggregation accomplished several functions. First, 
measures of education are unavailable through HMDA data, and the closest available proxy was mean 
census tract levels of education. By aggregating the data, the dependent and independent variables are 
measured at the same unit of analysis. Second, HMDA data at the loan level is quite large, and using a 
loan-level dataset is computationally intensive. Using data aggregated by census tract creates a more 
manageable dataset. Finally, examining data aggregated by geographic area reduces the high degree of 
correlation across mortgage applicants’ characteristics. The central tendencies of race, income, education, 
and credit status are less correlated by census tract than by individual mortgage borrowers. 
The analysis was conducted only on first lien refinance mortgage loans. Applicants seeking home 
purchase loans were excluded because these borrowers have a pending home purchase and are under time 
pressures that are unobservable and may contribute to differential loan search and application behaviors. 12 
Applicants for home improvement mortgages were also excluded because these loans vary significantly, 
from small loans for home repairs to large loans for extensive rehabilitation. The heterogeneity across 
home improvement loans makes this class of loan especially challenging to analyze. Refinance loans are a 
more discretionary segment of the mortgage market. Refinance loan applicants generally seek a lower (or 
more stable) interest rate, shorter loan terms, and/or equity to fund current consumption. Compared with 
purchase loan applicants, refinance borrowers have less time pressure, can search more, and have at least 
some previous experience with mortgages (Lee and Hogarth, 2000).  
HMDA regulations require lenders to report loan applications in Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs). Some lenders also submit loan records for rural, non-metropolitan areas. To eliminate any bias 
associated with lenders’ reporting decisions, non-metropolitan area tract-loan type combinations were 
dropped from the analysis, leaving 379 MSAs. In addition, the analysis is first presented for all tracts and 
then only for tracts with at least 30 loan applications in the HMDA data. The mean number of 
applications per tract was 173, with only 5 percent of tracts having fewer than 30. Since the outcome 
variables depend on loan applications as a denominator, tracts with small numbers of applications could 
bias the analysis with large proportional values. Also, these low-volume tracts are likely located in areas 
with few owner-occupied homes and may not represent the context of the typical mortgage transaction. 
The resulting dataset of 52,532 census tracts from 50 states was matched with census tract 
variables for the education level of residents aged 25 or older, as well as other demographic 
characteristics from the 2000 census including the share of owner-occupied homes and the share of 
households headed by individuals aged 65 or older. The final dataset represents more than 11.6 million 
loan applications that were submitted in 2005. Table 1 displays the number of loan applications by state, 
including each state’s mean rate of loan applications that were incomplete, withdrawn, or rejected. The 
significant variations by state suggest a need to control for unobserved differences across states.13 
Table 1 
Number of Mortgage Refinance Applications, Census Tracts, and Application Outcomes by State in 2005 
State 
Number of 
Applications 
Number of 
Tracts 
% 
Incomplete 
% 
Withdrawn 
% 
Rejected 
 
Alabama  125,414  749  6.84  16.16  23.21 
Alaska  15,951  86  7.61  15.82  12.77 
Arizona  411,842  974  7.5  13.92  12.25 
Arkansas  47,256  347  3.33  16.74  17.05 
California  2,289,909  6,844  4.99  16.23  14.62 
Colorado  225,976  899  4.66  20.68  13.42 
Connecticut  153,391  736  7.28  21.78  15.18 
Delaware  36,883  160  9.38  17.69  17.26 
Florida  958,078  2,956  7.9  18.55  15.35 
Georgia  331,791  1,228  6.83  17.45  18.64 
Hawaii  29,311  210  5.45  20.37  10.92 
Idaho  41,053  168  4.53  17.98  16.03 
Illinois  510,587  2,468  4.47  15.29  14.53 
Indiana  206,904  1,064  6.47  17.78  17.42 
Iowa  60,728  399  7.5  15.63  15.47 
Kansas  71,011  431  3.85  20.98  15.45 
Kentucky  83,736  535  3.66  14.58  15.64 
Louisiana  109,958  840  7.56  17.03  22.38 
Maine  37,371  185  4.32  19.24  11.66 
Maryland  386,493  1,147  4.13  20.22  12.89 
Massachusetts  295,030  1,345  5.85  19.23  10.45 
Michigan  458,815  2,201  7.42  17.16  18.01 
Minnesota  179,198  908  7.5  17.65  12.6 
Mississippi  36,793  257  5.15  19.17  22.88 
Missouri  217,315  929  3.63  20.43  15.73 
Montana  9,320  75  3.91  18.16  13.57 
Nebraska  33,716  268  6.64  17.02  14.08 
Nevada  159,990  420  4.88  20.28  13.6 
New Hampshire  43,778  160  8.95  15.87  11.93 
New Jersey  418,963  1,930  5.55  19.15  15.09 
New Mexico  47,951  276  3.45  19.09  14.59 
New York  474,680  4,378  9.07  20.21  18.57 
North Carolina  213,233  1,070  5.36  14.95  17.89 
North Dakota  6,490  66  9.08  13.1  12.55 
Ohio  394,832  2,404  4.24  18.17  19 
Oklahoma  78,686  640  3.55  25.32  15.44 
Oregon  125,627  554  5.02  18.19  14.96 
Pennsylvania  433,975  2,648  4.77  19.03  18.87 
Rhode Island  64,291  233  5.46  25.34  11.17 
South Carolina  111,184  643  7.92  16.37  17.47 
South Dakota  10,734  69  5.92  15.74  14.4 
Tennessee  181,379  902  4.4  22.61  18.49 
Texas  568,034  3,614  9.21  19.85  16.21 
Utah  88,652  424  7.55  14.21  15.07 
Vermont  7,149  44  6.29  12.28  9.78 
Virginia  343,770  1,307  3.15  15.45  14.13 
Washington  273,723  1,115  5.84  17.3  13.87 
West Virginia  30,134  264  2.29  12.89  17.9 
Wisconsin  178,239  927  8.39  14.64  10.83 
Wyoming  6,917  35  4.06  19.81  12.89 
Total  11,626,241  52,532  6.15  18.04  15.97 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applications.  14 
Variables 
The dependent variables used in the analysis include the following: 
•  Incomplete, the tract mean rate of all first lien refinance applications in the HMDA data that 
result in a lender labeling the application as incomplete. 
•  Withdrawn, the tract mean rate of all first lien refinance applications in the HMDA data that 
result in a lender labeling the application as complete but withdrawn. 
•  Rejected, the tract mean rate of all first lien refinance applications in the HMDA data that result 
in a lender approving the application but the borrower rejecting the loan offer. 
•  Rate Spread, the tract mean APR spread to the benchmark Treasury rate for high-cost loans for 
all approved and originated first lien refinance applications in the HMDA data (at least 300 basis 
points over the benchmark rate). 
 
Table 2 illustrates the tract-level means for the four dependent variables by education level. 
Education level is measured as the share of each tract’s population with a four-year college degree. This 
summary table suggests that incomplete and withdrawn applications have the predicted negative 
relationship with education level. Rejecting lender-approved loan applications appears to have the 
opposite relationship than hypothesized. 
Independent variables used in the analysis include the following: 
•  Non-white, the tract mean rate of all first lien refinance loan applications in the HMDA data 
submitted by a loan applicant in which the lender reported a race but that race was not white or 
Caucasian. 
•  Log Income, the natural log of the tract mean loan applicant income for all first lien refinance 
applications reported in the HMDA data. 
•  Hispanic, the tract mean rate of all first lien refinance loan applications in the HMDA data 
submitted by a loan applicant where the lender reported race/ethnicity and the applicant was 
labeled as Hispanic/Latino. 
•  Homeowner Rate, the tract mean rate of households reporting owning their own home in the 2000 
decennial census. 
•  Share College, the tract mean rate of population over age 25 reported to have completed a four-
year college degree in the 2000 decennial census. 
•  Share 65 or Older, the tract mean rate of the population reporting to be at least age 65 in the 2000 
decennial census.15 
Table 2 
Tract Mean Rate of College Education by Tract Mean Incomplete, Withdrawn, and Rejected 
First-Lien Refinance Loan Applications 
Loan Status  0–5% College  6–10% College  11–15% College  15% + College 
Incomplete  6.0  6.4  6.4  5.8 
Withdrawn  19.4  19.0  18.0  15.8 
Rejected  20.3  16.3  14.4  12.7 
Mean APR  5.00  4.87  4.81  4.75 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 16 
Tables 3 and 4 display summary statistics and correlations, respectively. The correlations suggest 
some caution regarding the collinear relationship between education and income, as should be expected. 
Statistical Methods 
Each outcome variable has the same basic specification, with variations in fixed effects and 
standard errors: 
Y (Mean Proportion Applications Incomplete, Mean Proportion Applications Withdrawn by Applicant, 
Mean Proportion Applications Rejected by Applicant, Tract Mean APR Spread) = ß1 * Log Mean 
Tract Application Income + ß2 * Proportion of Non-white Applicants + ß3 * Proportion of 
Hispanic Applicants + ß4 * Proportion of Tract Population College Graduate + ß5 * Proportion of 
Tract Population 65 or Older + ß6 * Proportion of Homes in Tract with a Mortgage + ßn State 
Fixed Effects + α + ε 
All models use robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and are estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications. State fixed effects are included in selected models as noted, 
but the coefficients for each state are not shown in the tables for clarity of presentation. Additional 
specifications using Tobit, Logit, and an OLS with log-log transformations generated similar results. The 
log-log transformation was problematic for tracts with 0 percent shares of key variables. Similar 
specifications using MSA or county fixed effects did not alter the results. State fixed effects were used 
primarily to control for unobserved state mortgage lending policies, but also to serve as a limited indicator 
of local housing market conditions. Clustering standard errors at either the state or MSA levels produced 
similar results, but MSA clustering was retained as a better approximation of local housing markets. 
Checks for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors also yielded results within acceptable bounds. 
RESULTS 
The results of each series of regressions are displayed in Tables 5–8. The results suggest that 
education level by tract has modest effects on the specified outcomes, generally as hypothesized, with the 
strongest effects for withdrawn applications and conflicting results for rejected loan offers. Income, race, 
and tract homeownership rates are related to the dependent variable as might be expected in most cases. 17 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable  n  M  SD  Range 
Incomplete  52532  6.15  4.53  0.00–100.00 
Withdrawn  52532  18.04  7.22  0.00–100.00 
Rejected  52073  15.97  9.03  0.00–100.00 
Rate Spread  50622  4.87  0.53  3.00–18.64 
Non-white  52407  21.29  24.48  0.00–100.00 
Log Income  52508  11.25  0.43  8.70–14.81 
Hispanic  52412  13.40  20.15  0.00–100.00 
Homeowner Rate  51270  59.71  23.65  0.00–100.00 
Share College  51357  10.59  7.34  0.00–166.67 
Share 65+  51357  12.45  7.27  0.00–100.00 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 18 
Table 4 
Summary of Correlations Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable  Incomplete  Withdrawn  Rejected 
Rate 
Spread  Non-white 
Log 
Income  Hispanic 
Homeowner 
Rate 
Share 
College 
Incomplete  —                 
Withdrawn  -0.127  —               
Rejected  -0.007  0.097  —             
Rate Spread  0.008  0.079  0.159  —           
Non-white  0.013  0.076  0.347  0.162  —         
Log Income  0.053  -0.252  -0.346  -0.185  -0.239  —       
Hispanic  0.084  0.017  0.043  0.026  -0.030  -0.042  —     
Homeowner Rate  -0.036  -0.060  -0.199  -0.077  -0.323  0.177  -0.236  —   
Share College  -0.030  -0.260  -0.335  -0.173  -0.256  0.673  -0.288  0.248  — 
Share 65+  -0.044  -0.008  -0.017  0.004  -0.133  0.012  -0.195  0.085  0.098 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census tract. 19 
Incomplete Applications 
Table 5 presents the results for the rate of incomplete mortgage applications by tract. As the share 
of the tract population aged 25 or older with a bachelor’s degree increases, the proportion of incomplete 
applications declines for purchase and refinance loans in either the first or subordinate positions. A 10 
percentage point increase in the proportion of college graduates is associated with about a one-half 
percentage point reduction in the share of incomplete applications in the tract, both including and 
excluding state fixed effects. These results comport with the hypothesis that education is negatively 
correlated with incomplete applications, although the relationship is weak in magnitude.  
Other covariates are also statistically significant but small in magnitude. Both a greater share of 
homeowners and a higher proportion of older residents are associated with a lower rate of incomplete loan 
applications. Surprisingly, the natural log of mean applicant income is associated with a higher rate of 
incomplete applications. The share of minority loan applicants and the share of applicants of Hispanic 
ethnicity have negligible effects in the more robust models. The variable for tract mean homeownership 
rate has small effects but suggests that tracts with higher homeownership rates have lower rates of 
incomplete applications. The tract share of the population aged 65 or older is associated with lower rates 
of incomplete applications. These results suggest that the rate of incomplete applications may be 
consistent with financial literacy deficiencies. It should be noted that the coefficient for college education 
rates remained statistically significant even after dropping smaller tracts, adding state fixed effects, and 
clustering robust standard errors at the MSA level.  
Withdrawn Applications 
Table 6 presents the results for the rate of withdrawn mortgage applications by tract. The 
relationship between college education rates and the rate of withdrawn applications is modest, although 
larger than in the models for incomplete applications. As the proportion of the tract population with a 20 
Table 5 
Predictors of the Proportion of Submitted Applications that were Incomplete 
  All Tracts    At Least 30 Applications in Tract 
Tract-Level Variable           
Share College Education  -0.0504    -0.0477  -0.0483  -0.0483 
  -9.22    -8.85  -8.8  -4.86 
Share Non-white Applicant  0.0017    0.0011  0.0031  0.0031 
  1.68    1.13  3.17  1.01 
Log Mean Applicant Income  1.2278    1.0666  1.3465  1.3465 
  12.08    10.76  11.44  6.59 
Share Hispanic Applicant  0.0096    0.0091  0.0084  0.0084 
  7.58    7.44  6.05  1.52 
Homeowner Rate  -0.0045    -0.0043  -0.0047  -0.0047 
  -3.5    -3.21  -3.63  -2.09 
Share 65+  -0.0163    -0.0176  -0.0224  -0.0224 
  -5.22    -5.84  -7.79  -3.51 
Constant  -6.8391    -5.0215  -8.1105  -8.1105 
  -6.32    -4.78  -6.42  -3.57 
           
State Fixed Effects        X  X 
MSA Clustered SE          X 
           
R
2 (adjusted)  0.01545    0.01424  0.2413  0.2413 
n  51,155    48,348  48,348  48,348 
Note: OLS estimates of coefficients and t-test (italics). Bolded coefficients significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 21 
Table 6 
Predictors of the Proportion of Submitted Applications Withdrawn by the Applicant 
  All Tracts    At Least 30 Applications in Tract 
Tract-Level Variable           
Share College Education  -0.1432    -0.1468  -0.1362  -0.1362 
  -18.22    -18.88  -16.49  -11.94 
Share Non-white Applicant  -0.003    -0.0023  -0.0049  -0.0049 
  -1.79    -1.42  -2.72  -1.33 
Log Mean Applicant Income  -1.7733    -1.8171  -2.9055  -2.9055 
  -12.63    -12.95  -16.97  -11.7 
Share Hispanic Applicant  -0.0141    -0.0178  -0.0364  -0.0364 
  -6.72    -8.91  -13.41  -6.77 
Homeowner Rate  -0.0114    -0.0152  -0.0101  -0.0101 
  -5.45    -7.02  -4.71  -3.23 
Share 65+  -0.0024    -0.0022  -0.0264  -0.0264 
  -0.46    -0.45  -5.07  -3.53 
Constant  40.4958    41.3435  53.7648  53.7648 
  26.51    27.07  28.51  19.07 
           
State Fixed Effects        X  X 
MSA Clustered SE          X 
           
R
2 (adjusted)  0.06556    0.08288  0.2294  0.2294 
n  51,155    48,348  48,348  48,348 
Note: OLS estimates of coefficients and t-test (italics). Bolded coefficients significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 22 
college education increases by 10 percentage points, the occurrence of withdrawn applications declines by 
about 1.5 percentage points. This may suggest that withdrawn loans signal poor application strategies or 
other problems. Similar to the model for incomplete applications, the share of applicants of a non-white 
race has little effect. As the mean loan applicant income in a tract increases, the rate of withdrawn 
applications declines, controlling for other factors. This finding is the opposite of the prior models for 
incomplete applications and is more consistent with what may be predicted. The variable for the tract rate 
of Hispanic loan applicants is weakly associated with the rate of withdrawn applications. A 10 percentage 
point increase in the mean rate of Hispanic loan applicants in the tract is associated with an increase in 
withdrawn applications of less than one-tenth of a percentage point. The share of owner-occupied homes 
is negatively related to withdrawn loan applications. A 10 percentage point increase in homeownership 
rates is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in withdrawal rates, perhaps suggesting some intra-
neighborhood knowledge sharing. A greater share of older residents in the tract is also associated with a 
lower rate of withdrawn loan applications. These results are generally as hypothesized and support the 
notion that as education levels increase the rate of withdrawn applications declines. The strength of these 
models may also suggest that the rate of withdrawn applications in the HMDA data could be a useful 
measure of financial literacy deficiencies in future studies. 
Approved Applications Rejected by the Borrower 
Loan applicants rejecting an approved loan offer could be interpreted in multiple ways, as 
discussed previously. If borrowers shop for the best combination of rates and terms after receiving a loan 
offer, rejecting approved loan offers could signal appropriate search behavior and better financial 
judgment. Alternatively, the most financially literate borrowers may be more selective prior to submitting 
applications and may only apply for the most attractive loan products that they know they will agree to in 
advance. Since completing a mortgage application incurs time costs and application fees, shopping prior 
to applying for a mortgage loan may be a more efficient strategy for a typical first lien refinance loan. The 23 
data support the latter explanation over the former. Table 7 presents the results for the rate of approved 
mortgage applications rejected by the loan applicant. As the share of college graduates in the tract 
increases by 10 percentage points, the share of rejected loan offers declines by about 1.5 percentage 
points. In contrast, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the population aged 65 or older is 
associated with a one-third percentage point increase in loan offer rejections. Interestingly, the share of 
owner-occupied homes in the tract is negatively associated with rejected loan offers. A 10 percentage 
point difference in tract homeownership rates is associated with about a 0.4 percentage point higher rate 
of borrowers rejecting lender offers. To the extent more homeowners in a tract present more neighbors 
with experiences in the mortgage market, this may indicate that applicants have the advantage of checking 
with neighbors. Controlling for other factors, the homeownership rate in the tract seems to be consistent 
with borrowers being more likely to back out of an offer. Tract mean applicant income also has a negative 
relationship with rejecting approved loan offers, which is consistent with the effects of education rates. 
While tract rates of non-white loan applicants are related to more rejections of loan offers, the rate of 
Hispanic applicants has small coefficients of low significance and changing direction with fixed effects 
and more robust modeling. The rejection of an approved loan offer may be a more complicated process 
than submitting an incomplete application or withdrawing an application, but the results suggest there are 
differences in tract search and rejection strategies related to education levels. 
APR Spreads for High-Cost Originated Loans 
Interest rates for high-cost loans, defined as loans with annual interest rates at least 3 percentage 
points greater than a 10-year Treasury note (the only rates reported in the HMDA data and a fair 
approximation for subprime loans) are another potential indicator of financial behavior among a subset of 
borrowers shopping for higher-cost mortgages. Table 8 presents the results of the models for the mean 
APR spread by the tract-level outcome variable. As the share of college graduates in the tract increases by 
10 percentage points, the mean APR spread decreases by about 5 basis points (where 100 basis points = 1 24 
Table 7 
Predictors of the Proportion of Lender Approved Loan Offers Rejected by the Applicant 
  All Tracts    At Least 30 Applications in Tract 
Tract-Level Variable           
Share College Education  -0.1465    -0.1556  -0.1303  -0.1303 
  -16.88    -19.27  -14.94  -9.68 
Share Non-white Applicant  0.0795    0.0793  0.0791  0.0791 
  34.89    37.33  34.45  9.37 
Log Mean Applicant Income  -3.475    -3.3085  -2.7479  -2.7479 
  -21.39    -21.59  -14.67  -6.54 
Share Hispanic Applicant  -0.0056    -0.0082  0.0107  0.0107 
  -2.21    -3.38  3.58  1.61 
Homeowner Rate  -0.0327    -0.0406  -0.0431  -0.0431 
  -13.01    -15.96  -17.08  -13.06 
Share 65+  0.0334    0.0286  0.0216  0.0216 
  5.43    5.28  3.73  2.47 
Constant  56.6327    55.4813  48.9072  48.9072 
  32.03    33.29  23.74  10.17 
           
State Fixed Effects        X  X 
MSA Clustered SE          X 
           
R
2 (adjusted)  0.1731    0.2102  0.2763  0.2763 
n  50,879    48,072  48,072  48,072 
Note: OLS estimates of coefficients and t-test (italics). Bolded coefficients significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 
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Table 8 
Predictors of Tract-Level Mean Annual Percentage Rate Spread 
  All Tracts    At Least 30 Applications in Tract 
Tract-Level Variable           
Share College Education  -0.0049    -0.0052  -0.0041  -0.0041 
  -8.83    -9.85  -7.27  -4.57 
Share Non-white Applicant  0.0027    0.0026  0.0021  0.0021 
  22.66    24.00  18.92  4.6 
Log Mean Applicant Income  -0.1399    -0.1237  -0.1856  -0.1856 
  -12.45    -11.09  -14.25  -7.0 
Share Hispanic Applicant  0.0003    0.0003  -0.0017  -0.0017 
  2.22    2.08  -11.39  -3.4 
Homeowner Rate  0    -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002 
  -0.23    -1.32  -1.6  -0.91 
Share 65+  0.0023    0.0024  0.0014  0.0014 
  5.81    6.68  3.8  2.54 
Constant  6.4011    6.2306  6.9646  6.9646 
  52.47    51.49  48.87  24.16 
           
State Fixed Effects        X  X 
MSA Clustered SE          X 
           
R
2 (adjusted)  0.05238    0.05663  0.1501  0.1501 
n  49598    47664  47664  47664 
Note: OLS estimates of coefficients and t-test (italics). Bolded coefficients significant at 1%.  
Source: Author’s tabulations of 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance loan applicants by census 
tract. 26 
percentage point). This small effect is approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation, but it remains 
statistically significant after controlling for other factors. By comparison, a 10 percentage point greater 
share of non-white loan applicants in the tract is associated with about a 2 to 3 basis points greater mean 
APR spread. Tracts with greater log mean loan applicant incomes have lower APR spreads for the high-
cost loans studied. The tract share of loan applicants of Hispanic ethnicity has very small and mixed 
effects that vary by model. A 10 percent greater share of the population aged 65 or older is associated 
with tract mean APR spreads that are about 1 to 2 basis points greater. The share of owner-occupied 
homes in the tract has no clear association with tract-level mean APR spreads. Because interest rates are 
determined by unobserved risk-based factors that may be correlated with race, income, and census tract 
location, the interpretation of this model should be subject to caution. Nonetheless, there is evidence that 
tracts with greater education levels pay lower mean interest rates for high-cost loans reported in the 
HMDA data. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Based on a tract-level analysis of 2005 HMDA data for first lien refinance mortgage applications 
paired with 2000 census data, several findings are worthy of discussion. Hypothesis H1, that tract 
education levels (defined as completion of a four-year college degree among individuals aged 25 or older) 
are negatively associated with the mean rate of borrowers submitting incomplete loans, is weakly 
supported. Hypothesis H2, that tract education levels are negatively associated with the mean rate of 
borrowers withdrawing loan applications, is supported. This outcome appears to offer a useful measure of 
behavior that could serve as a proxy for financial literacy among mortgage loan consumers. Hypothesis 
H3, that tract education levels are positively associated with the mean rate of borrowers rejecting 
approved loans, is largely rejected. The data support the alternative explanation that borrowers with more 
education are better able to engage in searches prior to submitting loan applications and are more likely to 
apply to lenders from whom they are most likely to accept an offer. Hypothesis H4, that tract education 27 
levels are negatively associated with interest rates on high-cost loans, is also supported, although the 
findings are small in magnitude. Other variables generally perform as predicted and support the direction 
of the effects of each dependent variable as a signal of behaviors that reflect greater or lesser levels of 
financial literacy. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the use of incomplete, withdrawn, 
and rejected loan applications in the HMDA data is a novel approach that was previously untested in the 
literature. Second, this study explicitly tests tract-level college completion rates as a proxy for the effects 
of education on loan application outcomes, finding small but statistically significant effects. These results 
suggest that tracts with lower-educated loan applicants display differing application behaviors regarding 
first lien refinance loans, even after controlling for other factors. Third, the results indicate that if higher-
educated consumers are shopping for mortgages, it is occurring before the loan application stage and not 
after the lender makes a loan offer. Lower-educated consumers may be engaging in inefficient application 
strategies by submitting incomplete applications, withdrawing applications, and rejecting approved 
refinance offers from lenders after investing resources into an application. This study also finds that tract-
level homeownership rates influence mortgage application decisions. This may reflect the fact that as an 
applicant is in an area with more homeowners, there is a greater likelihood of gaining information about 
alternatives. This study’s final contribution to the literature is its analysis of withdrawn applications in the 
HMDA data as a signal of financial literacy problems. A withdrawn application suggests the consumer 
requested the file to be closed before a credit application was made; the applicant never received a 
decision. This could be due to a change in circumstances, but given the up-front costs of making the 
application, it would be reasonable to wait for the lender’s decision. Alternative interpretations include 
that borrowers discovered they may not be approved, and wished to withdraw an application rather than 
be subjected to the emotional toll of being denied. Federal regulations require a lender to code an 
application as denied if such a decision was made, however. Another possibility is that mortgage 
borrowers who did not pay fees to lock in a specific interest rate feared that interest rates were rising and 28 
were no longer in the market to refinance. During 2005, interest rates were within an average of 5.5 
percent to 6.5 percent for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. Given this minimal variation and no rapid 
turning points (see Figure 1), this is an unlikely alternative explanation for withdrawn applications during 
the period analyzed. 
HMDA data are intended to monitor loan approvals and denials, which are the HMDA variables 
typically used in past studies. The incomplete, withdrawn, and approved but rejected variables have not 
been widely employed in the literature. This analysis is a preliminary attempt to derive informational 
value from these variables. Future research using these data at the loan application level, or aggregated to 
alternative levels of geography, may yield useful findings. These analyses could also be repeated for other 
classes of loans. Future studies could employ more robust and timely tract-level covariates as new census 
data become available and could explore HMDA data after the mortgage market crisis. Ideally, data on 
race and income could be interacted with education level to better isolate the effects of education from 
other factors. 
CONCLUSION 
This study uses HMDA data to provide evidence that first lien refinance loan applicants located 
in tracts with lower education levels are more likely to engage in inefficient loan application strategies, 
resulting in more incomplete and withdrawn applications, more rejections of loan offers from lenders, and 
higher interest rates on high-cost loans. The results indicate that potential borrowers with lower 
educational attainment engage in lower levels of searching for and processing of information about their 
mortgage options, resulting in wasted application efforts and marginally higher costs of credit. Clearly, a 29 
Figure 1 
Market Trends in 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
 
 
Source: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s (Freddie Mac) Weekly Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey (PMMS), Average Values. Data from: 
http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp. 
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lack of financial literacy can harm consumers when they apply for and take out home mortgages that they 
do not understand or cannot sustain. The extent of consumer financial literacy challenges in the mortgage 
market is an important component of the policy debate about regulating subprime lending and other forms 
of credit. To the extent problems with loan applications among consumers with lower incomes and 
education levels present a public policy problem, education, counseling, and disclosures are potential 
responses. Pre-application education and counseling, clearer pre-application and pending application 
disclosures, and the availability of advice may all be remedies that could aid lower-educated consumers 
during the loan application process. 
 31 
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